SETTING THE RECORD STRAIGHT ON IRAQI TERRORISM

(Note the Date)

By
Larry C. Johnson
27 January 2003

The course of action the United States pursues against Iraq in the coming months holds profound implications for the war on terrorism. As the Bush Administration marshals U.S. military forces in the Persian Gulf region and prepares to invade Iraq, it has devoted little attention to Iraq’s role in the war on terrorism other than to make unsubstantiated claims that Saddam Hussein has backed Al Qaeda. With the end of the first Gulf War and the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 687, Iraq was obligated to rid itself of weapons of mass destruction and end all support for terrorism. Inexplicably the international community focused its attention on finding and destroying Iraq’s chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons but ignored Baghdad’s continuing support for terrorism.

An invasion of Iraq will topple Hussein and eliminate Baghdad’s ability to develop or use weapons of mass destruction for the foreseeable future, but it will do little to destroy the infrastructure of radical Islamic terrorism responsible for the 9-11 attacks. In fact there is a serious risk that a U.S. led war against Iraq may crystallize the diffused anger in the Arab and Muslim world—a heretofore unattained goal of bin Laden and his followers—and persuade more Muslim youths to take up the terrorist banner against America and her citizens.

CLARIFYING IRAQ’S TERRORIST RECORD:

There is no doubt that Iraq is a state sponsor of terrorism—i.e., a country that provides financial support, safe haven, training, or weapons and explosives to groups or individuals that carry out terrorist attacks. From 1991 thru 2001 there were 4143 international terrorist attacks throughout the world. Saddam Hussein and his regime were implicated in at least 73 of these incidents, which accounted for fewer that two hundred fatalities. According to Central Intelligence Agency data, there is no credible evidence implicating Iraq in any mass casualty terrorist attacks since 1991. As reported in Patterns of Global Terrorism 2000, Saddam Hussein’s regime “has not attempted an anti-Western terrorist attack since its failed plot to assassinate former President Bush in 1993. However, Iraq continued to aggressively target and attack anti-regime opponents and UN personnel working in Iraq.”

During the Gulf War (1990-1991) Iraq made a concerted but futile effort to launch terrorist attacks against the U.S. led coalition. Saddam Hussein dispatched at least 40 two-man terrorist teams around the world. Most of these teams were apprehended or deterred. The few that reached their targets were incompetent or deterred by security measures. One team, for example, attempted to bomb the US Cultural Center in Manila on 19 January 1991, but the device prematurely detonated. The blast killed one of the Iraqi agents and badly injured the other. In Indonesia a team left a bomb in a flower box outside the US Ambassador’s residence in Jakarta. It was discovered by a gardener and rendered safe. The perpetrators escaped undetected. In another case an informant alerted Bangkok police to four terrorists plotting to attack U.S. airline offices.

Within months of signing off Security Council Resolution 687 Iraq launched attacks against Kurds, relief workers, and regime opponents operating in Northern Iraq. Starting with the 1992 PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM and continuing thru 2001, the U.S. Government annually admitted that Iraq was violating the terrorism provisions of 687. But no punitive actions were taken or proposed. With the United States unwilling to hold the Hussein regime accountable for violating the prohibitions pertaining to international terrorism, there should be little surprise that the Iraqis as well as other Middle Eastern governments assumed that Iraq had tacit approval to punish anti-regime dissidents and help anti-Iranian terrorists.

Iraq has directed most of its support for terrorism to groups that have attacked Iran and Israel. The United States Government accuses Iraq of providing sanctuary and/or assistance to six groups:

• Arab Liberation Front
• Palestine Liberation Front (PLF & Abu Abbas)
• Abu Nidal (ANO)
• 15 May (Abu Ibrahim)
• The Kurdish Worker’s Party (PKK)
• Mujahedin-e-Khalq

The Arab Liberation Front (ALF) is part of the PLO. The ALF, like the other factions of the Palestine Liberation Organization, left Lebanon in a US-brokered deal after Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon. Many ALF combatants ended up in Baghdad. Although the ALF continues to funnel money to Palestinians who carry out terrorist attacks against Israel, State Department has not identified this group with any significant terrorist attack in any issue of PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM since 1990.

The Palestine Liberation Front (PLF) split with the PFLP-GC in the mid-1970s. It subsequently split again, according to the U.S. State Department, into pro-PLO, pro-Syrian, and pro-Libyan factions. The pro-PLO faction, led by Muhammad Abbas (Abu Abbas), established a presence in Baghdad. Abbas’s group was responsible for the October 1985 hijacking of the Achille Lauro cruise ship. The PLF also launched a failed 1990 seaborne raid against Israel. This group continues to focus its wrath on Israel. During 2002 Israel recovered documents and arrested PLF members who testified that had received military training for terrorist operations in Iraq.

Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) was one of the most active and deadly terrorist groups in the 1970s and 1980s. Its leader, Sabri Al-Banna masterminded attacks that included the December 1985 Rome and Vienna airport massacres, the September 1986 hijacking of Pan Am Flight 73, and the July 1988 assault on the City of Poros day-excursion ship. During the 1990s ANO dramatically scaled back its activities and was implicated in only two terrorist attacks, with the last one occurring in 1995. Al-Banna disappeared from public view after seeking refuge in Baghdad in 1998, but resurfaced in August 2002 with the news that he shot himself several times in a successful “suicide” attempt while resisting Iraqi agents who were trying to arrest him.

The 15 May Organization, led by Muhammad al-Umari (aka Abu Ibrahim), was formed in 1979 and disbanded in the mid-1980s. 15 May was implicated in the 1981 bombings of El Al’s Rome and Istanbul, the August 1982 bombing of a Pan Am flight enroute from Tokyo to Honolulu, and attacks against the Israeli Embassies in Athens and Vienna. It has not been linked to terrorist attacks since 1984. Abu Ibrahim reportedly still lives in Iraq.

The Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) has received sanctuary in Iraq but the bulk of its support came from Syria and Greece. Since the arrest of its leader Abdullah Ocalan in 1999 in the car of the Greek Ambassador to Kenya, the PKK has scaled back its terrorist activities in Turkey and Europe.
Not surprisingly, Iran, the longstanding enemy of Baghdad, remains a primary target of Iraqi-backed terrorism. The Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK) aka The National Liberation Army of Iran has received significant support from Saddam Hussein since it was expelled from Iran in 1979. Of all the terrorist groups with sanctuary in Iraq, the MEK has been among the most active and the most deadly. According to the U.S. State Department, the MEK killed 70 high-ranking Iranian officials in a series of bombings in 1981. In April 1992 the MEK attacked Iranian Embassies in 13 different countries. Iraq provided direct support to MEK operatives in 1999 who assassinated several high-ranking Iranian Government officials, including Brigadier General Ali Sayyad Shirazi, Deputy Chief of Iran’s Joint Staff, who was killed in Tehran on 10 April.
Israel has been the other major target of Iraqi terrorism. Iraq’s funding and training of members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC) and the PLF now is beyond dispute. Documents seized by Israel in raids against Palestinian Authority offices in the West Bank during 2002 detail Iraq’s funding of Palestinian terrorism. Israeli officials provided CBS 60 Minutes correspondent Leslie Stahl documents in September showing that Saddam's closest deputy, Vice President Taha Yasin Ramadan, personally signed checks made out to Palestinian terrorist leaders who had organized suicide-bombing attacks. Kenneth Timmerman reported in a recent article in Insight Magazine that:
captured documents included ledgers of "martyrs" who have carried out suicide operations against Israel, showing how much and when each was paid and the number of the check. It included internal memoranda, computer disks, hard drives, videotapes and bank statements.

IRAQ, AL QAEDA AND ISLAMIC EXTREMISTS

In response to the Bush Administration’s stepped up efforts to confront Saddam over his continuing efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction, Iraq apparently has opened contacts with elements of Al Qaeda. Unlike Iran, who has a longstanding strategic relationship with Bin Laden and his terrorist network, Iraq’s ties are more recent and more tenuous. Nonetheless Iraq’s apparent willingness to share knowledge about chemical and biological weapons with Al Qaeda operatives may enable Bin Laden to acquire the capability that has so far eluded him.

The Bush Administration is particularly worried about Iraqi ties to Al Qaeda operative, Abu Musab Zarqawi, who reportedly received medical treatment in Iraq and is linked to a Taliban-style Islamic group in Northern Iraq that is battling Kurds. While this evidence is limited, it does suggest Iraq is willing to help a movement that it would otherwise oppose on ideological grounds. Nonetheless, it is important to understand that Iraqi entreaties to Al Qaeda, are most likely intended as a tactic to bolster Iraq’s ability to fight off a U.S. invasion rather than a deep-seated theological and ideological commitment to the terrorist agenda of Bin Laden.

The Islamic extremists who attacked the United States on 9-11 are guided by the ephemeral goal of the caliphate—a worldwide Islamic government. Driven by a deeply held belief that a restoration of Islamic ideas and practices will usher in a new reign of peace, Bin Laden and his cohorts have proselytized with mixed results. Although many newborns in Muslim countries reportedly have been named Osama, his calls for Muslims to rise up and attack US citizens and facilities have gone largely unheeded.

If we decide to invade Iraq we must be prepared for the contingency that our attack will inspire young Muslims to pursue jihad against the West in general and the United States in particular. Just as the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan rallied many Muslims, especially young adults to the cause of jihad, a U.S. attack may enable Islamic extremists to attract new followers. The lesson of the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan, however, is not a simple matter of angry Muslims rising up to fight infidels. External support from the United States and other governments, particularly Pakistan, played critical roles in providing jihadists with the money, organization, intelligence, and materiel that transformed them into an effective fighting force.

CONCLUSION

If war is averted and weapons inspectors remain in Iraq the United Nations must still deal with the issue of Iraqi support for terrorism. Unlike the seemingly impossible task of searching for weapons of mass destruction, reining in Iraqi support for terrorism is feasible. Compliance with UN Resolution 687 should include the following steps:
• The arrest of terrorists Abu Abbas and Abu Ibrahim.
• The closure of all offices and support companies linked to the PLF, ALF, ANO, PKK, MEK, PFLP-GC, and 15 May.
• The expulsion from Iraq of all members of these terrorist groups.
• Confiscation of all financial resources connected with these groups (and other terrorist groups).
• Inspection of suspected terrorist training camps.

If we go to war we must prudently prepare for expanded terrorist activity, at least in the short term, from Islamic extremists and their sympathizers. While we can hope that a US invasion will unleash a pent up Jeffersonian democracy inside Iraq, odds are that the United States and its UN allies will be forced to occupy Iraq for the foreseeable future. No occupying force, no matter how benign or charitable, will face opposition at some point from the local population. Add to this mix a belligerent outsider, like Iran, and the potential for terrorist attacks against the “occupying” force increases dramatically.

Anger alone is not enough to create a force willing to pursue a terrorist campaign. Support from other countries is critical. Eliminating terrorist training camps in Iran and Lebanon must remain at the top of the agenda or else the infrastructure for attacking US forces in Iraq will remain intact. Remnants of Al Qaeda, as well as Hezbollah and Hamas, activists may find themselves receiving encouragement and materiel support from Islamic extremists in Iran, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan to carry out attacks against “infidel” occupiers in Iraq.
International terrorism requires safehaven, money, and training if it is to be effective. Destroying Saddam’s ability to acquire and use weapons of mass destruction is a separate task from destroying the infrastructure that supports and sustains international terrorism. Doing both is not impossible but it requires we fully understand the task before us.

Larry Johnson is a former CIA analyst and a U.S. State Department counter terrorism official.